Hedging crude oil imports in developing countries by Claessens, Stijn & Varangis, Panos
F  Policy,  Research,  and  External  Affairs  1
WORKING- PAPERS
International  Trade
International  Economics  Department




Crude  Oil  imports




How a state oil-importing company can use risk management
instruments to insure against price fluctuations for crude oil.
The Policy, Rescarch, and External Affairs Complex distibutes  PRE Working Papers to disseminate the findtngs of  vork in progrcss a.d
to encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all others interested in development issues. These papers carry the names of
the authors, reflect only their views, and should be used and cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
















































































































dt  |  Poll~~~~~~~~~~~cy,  Research,  and External  Affairs|
International  Trade
WPS 755
This paper-  a product of the Intemaiional Trade Division, Intemational Economics Department  - is part
of a largereffort in PRE to study the benefits of using financial instruments to hedge the external exposures
of developing countries. Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington
DC 20433.  Please contact Dawn Gustafson, room S7-044, extension 33714 (46 pages).
Crude oil prices have become more and more  state oil-importing company locks in a price for
volatile since the 1973 oil crisis.  Particularly  its imports for one month ahead, and the long-
sinice  the recent Gulf crisis (crude oil prices rosc  tern  hedgc, in which it locks in the price for six
and fell sharply between August 1990 and March  months ahead.  I'he short-term hedge reduces oil
1991), producers, refiners, and consumers have  price volatility a potential 72 percent to 85
been interested in acquiring more assurances  percent; the long-term hedge, a potential 65
about the prices they would pay or receive over  percent to 81 percent.  For these reductions to be
future periods.  Increasingly they have used such  realized, the prices of the crude oils hedged must
risk management instruments as futures, options,  move together with the futures prices.  Tests are
and swaps to protect themselves against adverse  carried out to see if this is so.
oil price movements.
Apparently oil-importing developing
Claessens and Varangis show how risk  countries could gain considerably from using
managem'nt  instruments can be used by a state  financial risk management instruments.  But
oil-importing company to insure against price  several constraints - particularly negative
fluctuations for crude oil.  The main bencfit of  publicity and legal obstacles - can impede a
risk management is reduced uncertainty about  state oil-importing company's  use of risk man-
the oil prices consumers and the sLate  oil-  agement instruments.  Educating governmernt
importing company will pay rather than lower  policymakers and state enterprise officials about
average crude oil import prices.  the proper use, limits, and benerits of risk
management instruments will make them more
Claessens and Varangis simulate two  acceptable.
scenarios: the short-term hedge, in which the
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1.  I  IRODUCTION  *
Oil imports  in developing  countries  accounted  for approximately  14% of
total  import  expenditures  in recent  years.' However,  in  periods  of relatively
high oil  prices,  such  as during  the  early  1980s,  oil  imports  accounted  for  over
25%  of their  total  import  bill in  many  countries.  Oil  prices  have  continued  to
be very volatile,  varying  between  $13  and $40  per barrel  over the  last  decade.
The  instability  in  crude  oil  prices  has  resulted  in  market-based  pricing  of  crude
oil  by  many  exporters. In  1989,  market  priced  (variable  price)  crude  oil  exports
by OPEC increased  to about 8 million barrels  per day, or about 45Z of total
exports--up  from  3.5  million  barrels  per  day (or  about  26%)  in  1985 (World  Bank,
1991).  This change to spot pricing has increased  the risk to developing
countries  now that more of their petroleum imports  are at variable, market
prices.
The  increased  instability  in  the  petroleum  market  after  the  early  1970s  and
the  move towards  variable  pricing  gave  rise  to the  trading  of crude  oil  futures
contracts  on the  New  York  Mercantile  Exchange  (NYMEX)  in 1978. NYMEX  crude  oil
trading  volumes increased  from 2 million  barrels  per day in 1983 to over 80
million  barrels  per  day (approximately  1-1/2  times  world  daily  output)  in  1989.
In addition  to crude  oil futures,  NYMEX now trades  heating oil and gasoline
futures,  and  in 1986,  crude  oil  options  were  introduced  (reaching  a  volume  of  25
million  barrels  per  day  in  1989). Crude  oil  futures  and  options  are  now  the  most
actively  traded  contracts  ont  the  NYMEX. 2
*  The  authors  would  like  to  thank  especially  Mudassar  Imran  of the  World  Bank  for
his  valuable  comments. We  elso  would  like  to  thank  Ron  Duncan,  Takamasa  Akiyama
and  Robert  Myers for  their  helpful  suggestions.
'In  at least  19  developing  countries  oil  imports  accounted  for  20%  or more
of the  total  import  bill over the  period  1984-88.
'Other  exchanges  worldwide  also trade  futures  on crude oil and petroleum
products  such  as  the  London  International  Petroleum  Exchange  (IPE),  the  Singapore
International  Monetary  Exchange  (SIMEX)  and the  Rotterdam  Exchange  (ROEFEX)..3-
Use of these and other recently introduced  financial risk management
techniques  provide  scope  for  smoother  adjustment  of  developing  countries  to  oil
price  shocks  and  thus  enhance  their  ability  to  plan. The  objective  of the  paper
is to explore  the  application  of such risk  management  techniques  to a typical
developing  country state-owned  oil company (SOC) involved in importing  and
refining  crude  oil and  to  make  estimates  of the  potential  gains  from  using  such
techniques. The  paper is structured  as follows. First,  we describe  the  crude
oil price data that we use in the study and estimate  the volatility  of oil
prices. The  next two  sections  discuss  the  nature  of  a typical  SOC's  exposure  to
oil prices  and present  risk management  applications  for  each of the  exposures
identified.  Section  five  discusses  the  internal  and  external  constraints  to  the
use  of options  and  futures  hedges  typically  encountered  in  a developing  country
and  provides  some  possible  remedies. Section  six  concludes.
2.  CRUDE  OIL PRICES  AND OIL  PRICE  VOLATILITY
We explore  the  application  of risk  management  techniques  to 15  crude  oils
which together  represent  a very large  part of crude  oil imports  by developing
countries.  The  crudes  can  be classified  according  to  their  geographical  areas  of
origin  as follows  (the  country  of origin  is inside  the  parentheses):
Middle  East:  Dubai (Abu Dhabi),  Arab Light (Saudi  Arabia),  Khafji
(Neutral  Zone).
Africa:  Es  Sider  (Libya), Saharan  (Algeria), Bonny  Light
(Nigeria).
Eurove:  Brent (U.K.)
North  America:  Alaska  North  Slope  (USA),  West  Texas  Intermediate  (USA)
Istmo  (Mexico).
South  America:  Lagotreco  (Venezuela),  Bachaquero  (Venezuela),  Oriente
(Ecuador),  Cano  Limon (Colombia).
ALSa:  Attaka  (Indonesia).
With  the  exception  of the  Khafji  and  Bachaquero  crudes,  all  others  are  so-called
light  to  medium  crudes  (API  gravity  30°  to  40°).  Light  to  medium  crudes  account-4-
for the bulk of international  trade since they are preferred  by refineries
because  of their  good  yields.
The risks  associated  with importing  these  crudes  can be measured  by the
volatility  of their  prices. As a  measure  of  volatility,  we use the  coefficient
of variation  based on monthly observations  for the period January 1986 to
December  1990.3 The estimated  coefficients  of  variation  are  presented  in  Table
1. For  most crudes  the  coefficient  of variation  is between  25% and 30%.  This
volatility  is  high even  by comparison  with  ocher  primary  commodities.  Op  average
the  volatility  for  all  primary  commodities  was  around  17%  for this  period.
Table  1:  COEFFICIENTS  OF VARIATION  FOR  CRUDE  OILS /a
WTI  2 .,-3
ISTMO  24.95
ORIENTO  28.02
LAGOTRECO  /b  2.48




ALASKA  NORTH  SLOPE  20.22
ES SIDER  29.61
SAHARAN  29.16
KHAFJI  26.26
ARAB  LIGHT  26.86
ATTAKA  27.66
BONNY  LIGHT  27.89
m  For the period January 1986 to December 1990.
LR  For  the  period  August  1988  to December  1990.
3Data  on crude  oil prices  were obtained  from  Platt's  Oilgram  Price  Report
and the  World  Bank's  petroleum  price  data  base.-5s-
3.  RISKi4A?AMENT  PROBLEMS  OF A TYPICAL_SATE-O_WNED  OIL1 -COMPAN
A  typical  SOC is involved  in  purchasing  crude  and  petroleum  products  for
domestic energy needs.  While SOCS are exposed to international  oil price
volatility,  domestic  prices  are not always immediately  adjusted  in line with
international  price  movements. The  SOC  often  has to  absorb  the  consequences  of
this imperfect  adjustment  and has therefore  an exposure  to international  oil
price  risk.
OA the  basis of a typical  SOC's  operating  procedures,  two types  of risk
management  problems  can  be distinguished:  transaction  risk and long-term  risk.
Transaction  risk refer to the  price uncertainty  between  the time of ordering
crude oil and the time of delivery.  Long-term risk refers to the price
uncertainty  over  a longer  planning  horizon,  say  six  months  or a  year.  For  each
of  the  problems  a  different  risk  manag,ment  strategy  is  applicable.  However,  the
two  risk management  strategies  follow  a logical  sequence:  the  SOC would first
engage  in  transaction  risk  management  (i.e.,  short-term  risk  management)  and  the
in long-term  risk  management.
i) TRANSACTION  RISKS:
The typical  SOC  commits  to a purchase  of crude  oil  a considerable  period
ahead  of actual  loading,  while  the  price  of crude  is  determined  at the  time  of
loading.  The time  difference  between  the  purchasing  commitment  and the  date of
loading  varies,  but usually  is from  20 to 50 days.  To  analyze  more concretely
the transaction  risk,  we describe  the case of the SOC of Costa Rica (RECOPE)
which  is  representative  of  many  other  SOCs. The  following  time-axis  illustrates
the transaction  risk  management  problem  for  RECOPE.-6-
Time: -(50.20)  -(20-15)  0  +30  +(38-40)
(days)
I  ~  ~  ~~I  I  I  I
A  A  C  D  E
Date:;civt
A:  RECOPE  decides  on its  production  program  and  contracts  the  carrier
B:  RECOPE  pays in cblones  (local  currency)  to the  Central  Bank
C:  RECOPE  date  of loading  (bill-of-lading)  and  setting  of price
D:  Payment  to the  seller  (by  the  Central  Bank through  a foreign  bank)
E:  Return  of excess  payment  (in  colones)  by the  Central  Bank to  RECOPE.
RECOPE  decides  on its  program  of production  (whether  to run the  refinery
and  which  product  mix  to produce)  on the  10th  of every  month,  based  on expected
demand,  prices  and  market  sentiment,  and  makes  an  assessment  of  the  future  prices
of the  different  crudes  and  refined  products.  It then  decides  which crudes  and
refined  products  to import  and  contracts  with its  suppliers.  Five  days  later  the
suppliers  confirm  availability,  the  contract  is  finalized  and  RECOPE  agrees  with
the supplier  of the crude (or  refined  product)  to take delivery.  RECOPE  then
contracts  with independent  shipping  companies  for loading  of the difference
crudes at various ports.  There is a minimum of 15 days between the time of
contracting  the  shipper  (A)  and  actual  loading.  The  actual  loading  (C)  therefore
does  not  happen  until  20 to 50  days  after  RECOPE  decides  its  production  program
(A). 4 The actual  price  paid for the  crude  is set  at the  date of loading  at the
then  prevailing  international  spot  price.
Approximately  20  to 15 days  before the bill-of-lading date, RECOPE
transfers  the  expected  sum due  on the  bill-of-lading  date to the  Central  Bank,
adding  10  for  possible  variation  in  oil  price  and  exchange  rate  over the  20 to
'50  days  is  the longest  time lag and occurs if RECOPE decides to import
crude  on the  10th  day  of  a month  for  delivery  at the  end  of the  next month.-7-
i5 day period (B).  The Central  Bank then arranges  a letter-of-credit  with a
fore'gn  bank to  be used  for  payment  at the  date  of loading.  The letter  of credit
is  cashed  about  30  days  after  the  bill-of-lading  date  when  payments  are  made to
the seller  (D).  About 8 to 10 days after  the letter  of credit is cashed,  any
excess  payments 'the  difference  between the actual  payments  and the expected
payments  plus  the  10%)  are  returned  by the  Central  Bank  to  RECOPE  in  colones  (E).
RECOPE  is  exposed  to  two  type  of  risks  over  the  period  from  contracting  the
shipper  (A)  and  receiving  the  excess  payments  (E):  dollar-colone  exchange  risks
and  oil  price  risks.  The  exchange  rate  risk  is  as  follows.  Between  points  in  time
A and  D  RECOPE  faces  the  risk  that  the  colone  exchange  rate  depreciates,  in  which
case its  foreign  currenicy  payment  at time  D will  be more in colones  terms  than
expected  and  it  will  receive  less  back  of the  10%  variation  margin.  In  addition,
RECOPE  faces  exchange  rate  risks  between  points  D and  E on any  excess  payments.
RECOPE  faces  oil  price  risks  since  it  has  to  decide  where  to  obtain  its  supplies
50 to 20 days (A)  before  the  actual  price  to  be paid is determined  (C).  If oil
prices  increase  in this  period,  RECOPE  will  have to incur  the  extra  costs  since
it cannot  change  or cancel  its  order (or  only at  very high costs).
ii)  LONG-TERM  RISKS:
Long-term  risk  concerns  the  transmission  of changes  in international  oil
prices from the SOC to the domestic  economy  over some planning  period.  The
allocation  of the long-term  risk between  the SOC and the rest of the economy
derends  on the  internal  pricing  system  for  energy  products. At one  extreme,  the
internal  pricing  system  may  transmit  all  international  price  volatility  directly
to the final  consumer.  In this case,  the SOC does not face any risk but the
economy  does.  At the  other  extreme,  the internal  pricing  system  insulates  the
domestic  consumer  from  world  price  fluctuations  by maintaining  a fixed  domestic
price.  In this  case,  all  price  risk lies  with the  SOC.  In reality,  maintenance
of  fixed  domestic  prices  over  a  long  period  is  impossible  without  undermining  the
viability  of the  SOC, imposing  budget  deficits,  and  distorting  consumption  and-8-
investment  decisions.  More  commonly,  domestic  prices  are  fixed  for  some  period
of  time,  say  six  months,  in  which  case  the  risk  within  that  period  lies  entirely
with  the  SOC.
Whether  the  risk  lies  with  the  SOC  or  with  the  domestic  consumer,  the  SOC
is  in  a  position  to  manage  it  for  its  own  benefit  as  well  as  for  the  benefit  of
the  economy  as  a  whole.  The  SOC  is  the  logical  place  to  manage  such  risks  since
it  has  a  physical  exposure  through  purchasing  oil)  and  can  thus  "match'  physical
with  futures  or options  trading. It also  has a good  knowledge  of the  oil
markets.-9.
4. RISK  MANAGEMENT  TECHNIQUES
i) Hedging  Transaction  Risks
The  transaction  exposure  to  oil  price  risks  could  be  managed  using  futures
on oil  or options  on futures  on oil. 5
HixigngxJ  wi  tuh  e  s
The  SOC  has  a  short  position  in  oil  because  it  has  a  commitment  to  satisfy
domestic  demand  and  domestic  prices  cannot  be  adjusted  instantaneously.  To  hedge
the  resulting  price  risk,  we seek  an  asset  whose  return  is  positively  correlated
with oil prices.  Then as oil prices go up, the return  on the hedging  asset
increases  to  offset  the  additional  cost  of  higher  import  prices  for  the  SOC. The
purchase  of futures  contracts  is a good example  of such an asset.  The basic
concept  of futures  contracts  is that the  buyer  of a futures  contract  purchases
a specific  asset at a specified  price on a specific  date.  Contract terms
(amounts, grades, delivery dates, etc.)  are  all  standardized in  futures
contracts,  and futures  are  traded  only  on organized  exchanges  through  clearing
house  systems. To  ensure  good  performance  on  these  contracts,  profits  and  losses
on futures  are  settled  daily,  and  futures  contracts  require  a small  "margin"  as
collateral  (see further  Annex 1). If spot oil prices rise over the planning
horizon,  so  will futures  prices. The  profit  from  selling  futures  contracts  back
at the  higher  price  will  offset  the  extra  cost  of importing  oil. Conversely,  if
price-s  fall lower  oil import  costs  offset  the  loss  on the  futures.
The transaction  risk of the SOC could  thus be managed  using futures  as
follows. On the  date  of arranging  the  purchase  of  oil,  the  SOC  could  buy  an oil
futures contract.  The maturi  .,  date of the contract  should be as close as
possible  to  the  expected  date  of  loading,  but  not  before  it.  The  futures  contract
sFor  more details regarding  the use of futures  and options see Masuoka
(1990), Kolb  (1985) and Labuszewski  and Myhoff (1988) a,b.  For  another
agplication  to oil, but from the producers'  point of view, see also Overdahl
(986)  .-10-
would be for the same volume  of oil as the oil contracted  for  purchase.  The
contract  would  be terminated  through  a  reverse  transaction  in  the  futures  market
(i.e.,  selling the futures  contract)  on the date of loading (note that even
though  futures  contracts  specify  physical  delivery,  by reversing  contracts  this
does  not  need to  happen).  In this  way the  effective  price  paid for  the  oil  will
be locked  in  on the  date  of entering  the  agreement  with the  shipping  company.
For  example,  assume  that  in  March  1991  the  SOC  plans  to  buy crude  oil  two
months  ahead  i.e.,  in  May 1991,  in  the  amount  of  10,000  barrels,  where  the  price
to be pai.d  would  be the spot  Mexico (Istmo)  price  two  months  from  now. The SOC
would then buy 10 futures  contracts of 1,000  barrels each, maturing in two
months.'  The  price of  the May  1991 futures contract is quoted as  say
$18.50/barrel.  The  SOC  would  have to  put  up  about  $12,000  in  margins.  Two  months
later,  a  gain  or loss  in  the  import  cost  of the  crude--arising  from  fluctuations
in  the  Istmo  oil  price--is  offLet  by the  loss  or gain  in the  futures  contracts.
The  offset may not be exact because of basis risks (see below). Between
initiating  the  futures  contracts  and  closing  them  out,  transfers  of  cash to  and
from  a  broker  will  be required  almost  every  day  because  the  gains  and losses  in
the  futures  contracts  are  settled  daily.
Hedging  with  ORtiong
The  main  disadvantage  of  hedging  with  futures  is  that  the  potential  bernefit
of an import  price decline  is eliminated  along  with the  potential  loss of an
import  price  increase. 7 Yet  falling  import  prices  are  clearly  desirable  because
this  reduces  the  SOC's  cost.  Hedging  with options  provides  protection  against
upward  price  movements  while  still  allowing  the  SOC to gain  from  a price  fall.
But this  asymmetry  has a cost.
6  Here,  for simplicity  the delivery  date is assumed  to coincide  with the
timing  of the import  costs.
7Another  disadvantage  can  be the  unpredictability  of  the  margin  requirements
with the implications  for liquidity.-11-
A  number  of  technical  terms  are  involved  in  options.  We  explain  the  most
important:  (a)  If  the  option  gives  the  right  to  buy,  the  option  is  a "call'
option;  if  it  gives  the  right  to  sell,  it  is  a "put"  option;  (b)  The  asset  on
which  the  option  is  written  is  referred  to  as the  "underlying"  asset;  (c)  The
price  at  which  a  buyer  of the  option  can  buy  or  sell  the  underlying  asset  is
called  the  "strike"  or "exercise"  price;  (d)  If  the  right  to  buy  or sell  is
exercised  by the  buyer,  the  option  is  "exercised;"  (e)  The  date  on  (or  before)
which  the  buyer  can  buy  or  sell  the  underlying  asset  is  called  the  "maturity"  or
"expiration"  date;  (f)  An  option  which  can  be  exercised  only  on  the  expiration
date  is  called  a "European"  option;  an  option  which  is  exercisable  on  or  before
the  expiration  date  is  an  "American"  option;  and  (g)  The  price  of  the  option  is
calleci  a "premium."  The  buyer  pays  the  premium  to  the  seller  at the  time  of
contracting.
Oil  options  are  written  on  futures  contracts  on  oil  with  a  maturity  equal
to  the  maturity  of  the  option  and  are  American-style  options.  Oil  call  options
are  the  most  relevant  for  an  oil-importing  SOC.  An  oil  call  option  gives  the  SOC
the right,  but not the  obligation,  to  buy a futures  contract  for oil  at a
predetermined  price  called  the  strike  price. If  the  futures  price  at  maturity
is  higher  than  the  strike  price  then  the  call  option  is  valuable  and  will  be
exercised  (because  the  SOC  can  buy  at the  lower  strike  price  and  sell  at the
higher  market  price).'  Bt.t  if  the  futures  price  at  maturity  is  lower  than  the
strike  price  then  the  option  will  expire  without  value.  Purchasing  call  options
allows  the  SOC  to lock  in  maximum  prices  for  imported  oil  over  the  planning
horizon  (subject  to  basis  risk),  at  the  cost  of  the  premiums  on  the  options.
Compared  to  futures  contracts,  options  have  the  following  three  interesting
characteristics.  First,  futures  "lock-in"  a  price,  but  options  contracts  limit
the  maximum  loss  (equal  to  the  premium  paid  up-front)  and  leave  an  opportunity
to  take  advantage  of favorable  price  movements. Options  thus  have flexibility
'It  can  also  be  exerci.Led  before  maturity  date  since  the  option  is  American.-12-
in payoff  profiles.  Second,  the  buyer  has to pay the  premium  up-front. 9 This
often  requires  a significant  amount  of cash. Third,  while  the  buyer  of options
faces  the  credit  risk  or  default  risk  of the  counter-party,  the  seller  does  not.
Opcions  are  not  subject  to  margin  calls.  It is  the  seller  who is liable,  not the
buyer.
The SOC  would buy call options at the same time as making purchase
arrangements.  The  maturity-date  of the  option  would  be as close  as  possible  to
the  expected  date  the  purchase  is  settled  but  not  before  it.  For  example,  if  the
SOC contracted  in January  1991 to purchase  one month ahead,  paying  the then-
current  oil  price,  the  SOC  could  have  bought  a  March  call  option  with  an  exercise
price of say $22 dollar/barrel. On January 21, 1991, it  would have paid a
premium  for  this  option  of $1.10. If  oil  prices  moved  above  $22/barrel,  the  gain
on the  call  option  would  have  been  offset  by the  increase  in  import  costs  and  the
net price paid would have been $22/barrel,  plus the cost of the premium,  or
$23.10/barrel.  If  the  oil  price  fell,  the  net  price  paid  would  be the  actual  oil
price,  plus the  premium.
Options  are  available  with  several  exercise  prices:  the  lower  the  exercise
price,  the  more insurance  the SOC  obtains,  but the  higher the  premium  for the
call option.  As an example,  Figure  1 plots the premium  as a function  of the
exercise price for January 21, 1991 options (source of data: Wall Str1eS
jurjal).  As can  be observed,  option  premiums  are decreasing  in the exercise
price (and,  in general,  increasing  in the  maturity  of the  contract.)
Which  exercise  price  of the  call  option  will  suit  the  needs  of  the  SOC best
will depend  on, among  others,  the following  two factors.  First,  the impact  of
higher  oil  prices  on the  SOC's  cashflows  and  profitability.  Through  sensitivity-
derived  scenarios  the  SOC  can  determine a  profile  of  cashflows  and
profitabilities  under  different  oil  prices.  This will provide the SOC  with an
'There  exist futures-style  options  where the premium  does not need to be
paid  upfront,  but where  a (daily-adjusted)  margin  is  required.-13-
Opt  ion  Premiurr.s  on  WTI
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indication  of which  oil price levels  are acceptable  in terms  of profitability
(for  which  no insurance  needs  to  be obtained)  and those  price levels  which  are
not acceptable  (for  which price insurance  needs to be obtained).  Price level
insurance  could then be obtained  by buying  call options  with exercise  prices
equal  to  the  price  level  at  which  prices  become  unacceptable  in  terms  of cashflow
and profitability.  For example, the SOC could determine that prices above
$25/barrel  lead  to  negative  cashflows  and  that  call  options  with  exercise  prices
of $25/barrel  need to  be  bought. The  second  main factor  determining  the  choice
of options  will  be the  SOC's  expectations  about  future  oil  prices.  On this  basis
SOC  may decide  that  a particular  option  is attractively  priced.  It should  be
realized,  however, that prices of options already reflect  market sentiment
regarding  future  oil  price  movements  and  options  are  efficiently  priced, i.e.,
provide  no opportunity  for  profitable  arbitrage  and  no consistent  rewards  for-14-
speculators.  It  would  thus  be  difficult  to  make  profits  by  buying  certain  options
at certain  times  and, in  general,  the  SOC's  own price forecasts  should  play a
minor  role  in  deciding  whether  to  buy an  option  or which  option  to  buy since  it
cannot  be expected  that  che  SOC is  able to consistently  beat the  market.
Basis  Risk
Futures  and  options  on oil  are  available  on several  exchanges,  including
the  New York Mercantile  Exchange  (NYMEX)  where they are  written  on West Texas
Intermediate  (WTI)  (contract  terms  are listed  in Annex  1, certain  restrictions
apply). However,  most  SOCs  in  developing  countries  do  not  import  WTI  crude  oil.
Using futures  or options  based  on the  WTI to  hedge  other  crude  oil  price
risks  could  expose  the  SOC to  so-called  "basis  risks":  the  possibility  that  the
WTI futures  price  moves  differently  than  the  hedged  crude  oil  price. The  hedge
ratio,  the  amount  of futures  or options  contracts  to  buy as a fraction  of the
amount  of  physical  crude  oil  bought,  could  be adjusted  to  minimize  the  degree  of
basic risk.  A hedge ratio of one would imply  that for  each 1,000  barrels of
imports  one  WTI  futures  contract  (equivalent  to  1,000  barrels)  would  be bought.'°
The optimal hedge ratios were calculated  in accordance to the methodology
outlined  in  Annex  2. The  relevant  equation  to  derive  the  hedge  ratio  is  equation
2.5 of Annex 2 relating  spot prices  of different  crudes to the WTI futures
prices. The  slope  coefficient  b from  this  equation  is the  optimal  hedge  ratio.
Results  from  estimating  hedge  ratios  for  the  15  crudes  are  given  in  Table  2. The
relevant  futures  are  the two  nearby  New  York crude  oil futures  contracts  based
on  WTI. Monthly  averages  of  daily  futures  price  data  for  the  period  August  1986
to  December  1990  are  used  as independent  variables. For  all  crudes,  the  monthly
averages  of the  cash  prices  are  used as the  dependent  variables.
' 0A  hedge ratio  of one can also  be used if the  SOC decides  to use options
instead  of futures. For  proof  see  Annex 2.-15-
Tab1e  JZ: HEDGE  RATIOS  FOR  THE  DIFFERENT  CRUDES
;  ~~~~~~~bi  /  bi  - O  b;  1 21  R  D.W.
t-Stat  t-stat
Istmo  (Hex)  1.08  16.53  1.19  0.88  2.02
Lagotreco  0.85  10.73  -1.89  0.69  1.89
(Ven)
Lagotreco  j/  0.92  9.63  -0.84  0.78  1.84
Oriente  (Ecu)  1.01  12.24  0.13  0.77  1.99
Cano Limon  1.05  15.03  0.73  0.85  1.99
(Col)
Bachaquero  0.64  8.95  4.94  0.60  2.05
(Ven)
WTI (USA)  1.03  30.75  1.03  0.97  1.96
Dubai (Abu  1.00  17.79  0.00  0.86  1.92
(Daubi)
Brent (U.K.)  1.07  19.13  1.28  0.88  1.91
Alaska  North
Slope (USA)  1.06  18.11  1.03  0.86  1.93
Es Sider  1.09  14.39  1.18  0.84  1.94
(Libya)
Arab Light
Saudi  Arabia)  1.01  14.40  0.21  0.80  1.83
Attaka (Indo)  1.03  14.60  0.36  0.80  1.85
Bonny  Light  1.08  16.10  1.17  0.83  1.73
(Nig)
Sahara  1.12  14.48  1.55  0.84  1.96
(Algeria)
Khafji  (Neutral
Zone)  0.97  13.22  -0.41  0.74  1.79
/  b,  signifies  the  hedge  ratio.
~/  This  column  shows  the  t-statistic  for this  coefficient  biin the equation
Pi  - bi  of 1. +  th  from  testing  the  hypothesis  b;  - 1. i.e.,  the  hedge ratio
is equal  to one.  The  previous  column  shows  the t-statistic  from  testing
the  hypothesis  b,- 0.  A high t-statistic  implies  that  the  hypothesis
bi  - k (for  k - 0,1)  may  be rejected;  a low  statistic  indicates  that  this
hypothesis  may be accepted.
J  Regression  results  for  the  sub-period  August  1988 to December  1990.-16-
Table  2  indicates  that,  with  the  exception  of  Bachaquero,  all  15  crudes  can
be hedged effectively  using the WTI futures  contract.  The high R2 from the
regressions  indicates  that  basis  risk  is  small  (between  3%  and  23%)." Excluding
WTI (which  is expected  to  have  extremely  low  basis  risk since  the  N.Y.  contract
is  written  on it),  most of the  remaining  crudes  have  basis  risk  between  15%  and
20%. The  closest  relationships  with  the  N.Y.  futures  contract  are  exhibited  by
Dubai,  Brent,  Alaska  North  Slope,  Istmo,  Cano  Limon,  Es Sider,  Bonny  Light  and
Saharan  (basis  risk  between  12% and 17%).  Th-  orst  performers  are  Bachaquero,
Khafji,  and  Lagotreco  (for  the  period  Janau:y  1986  to  December  1990). However,
in  the  recent  period  (after  July  1988),  the  Lagotreco  price  has  followed  the  N.Y.
futures  contract  price  more  closely,  and  basis  risk  has  declined  from  31%  to  22%.
Bachaquero  and  Khafji  are  so-called  heavy  crudes,  with  smaller  price  variability,
since they are relatively  more price-inelastic. The WTI contract  cannot  be
expected  to  hedge  the  price  risk  of  these  two  heavy  crudes  well. Khafji  performs
better  in terms  of  basis  risk,  probably  due  to the  fact  that  it is  not as heavy
as Bachaquero  (API  gravity  of 250  versus 17').  The contrast  between  a crude
having  a  close  relationship  with  WTI  and  one  that  does  not  is  also  shown  in  Annex
Figures  Al (Istmo-WTI)  and  A2 (Bachaquero-WTI)  respectively.
We examined  also  what happens to basis risks if, instead  of buying the
contract  with an expiration  date  nearest to delivery,  the SOC  buys a contract
with a later  expiration  (second  to fourth  contract  from  delivery). The results
indicate  that  this  would  lead  to  only  a small  increase  in  basis  risk  (an  average
of 1.1%,  with 4% being the  highest (Lagotreco)).  Again the  hedge ratio is  not
significantly  different  from one.
The hypothesis  that the  hedge  ratio  is  equal to  one, is  accepted  for  all
crudes,  except  Bachaquero,  as indicated  by the figures  in the third  column  of
" tBasis  risk is one  minus  the  R2.-17-
Table 2.12  Using a hedge ratio  of one, rather  than the  estimated  ratio,  basis
risk  increased  at most  by 2X  and there  was  no increase  in  basis  risk  for  Dubai,
Oriente  and  Arab  Light. For  most  crudes,  basis  risk  increased  by  only  1  to  1.5X.
The  hedge  ratios  derived  so far  refer  to  hedging  the  physical  (barrels  of
oil).  When hedging dollar expenditures,  hedge ratios can be obtained by
estimating  the b,'s  based on spot and future  prices,  expressed  as percentage
differences  rather  than as absolute  dollar  amounts. This was done for all 15
crudes and the results are very similar to those obtained for hedging the
physical. The  hedge  ratios  are  found  to  be  not  significantly  different  from  one,
but there  was an increase  in  basis  risk  compared  to hedging  the  physical.
In summary,  therefore,  the  results  indicate  that the SOC can reduce  its
transaction  exposure  by between  74X  and  86X  for  all light  and  Khafji  crudes  and
that a hedge ratio  of one can  be used for  WTI options  as well as for futures
contracts. Only in  the  case  of Bachaquero  crude  did  we find  a  weak relationship
with the WTI futures  price and thus it would be inadvisable  to use WTI for
hedging  Bachaquero  crude  oil imports.
ii)  Hedging  Long-Term  Price  Risks
Management  of the  transaction  risks  will only reduce  oil  price risk  over
a short  horizon  (one  to three  months),  will  mainly  protect  the  SOC,  and  will  not
hedge  the  risks  for  the  entire  developing  country. A strategy  for  managing  the
long-term  oil  price risks  would  be to  use longer-dated  futures  contracts.  This
strategy  would involve  buying a series  of futures  contracts  with maturities
varying  from  say three  to 12  months.  The amounts  to  be bought  would  reflect  the
anticipated  imports  of crude  oils in each month. The hedges would be put in
place,  for  example,  at the  start  of each fiscal  year,  and  not  be changed  during
the  year,  or could  be rolled  forward  during  the  year and  thus  cover  overlapping
' 2A hedge  ratio  hi her than  one  means  that  in  excess  of one  contract  of  WTI
is needed  to hedge 1,00  barrels  of imports.-18-
fiscal  years.  If this strategy  is pursued,  the  short-term,  transaction  hedges
would  not  be necessary  (or,  at least,  they  would  have to  be modified).
We  simulate  here  the  following  long-term  hedging  strategies.  We  assume  that
in  July and January  of each  year the  SOC  wants to lock in import  prices  over a
six-month  planning  horizon.' 3 Since  trading  in the nearby  futures  contract  is
not very liquid, we assume  that the  SOC buys contracts two to seven  months ahead.
For  example,  in  July of  each  year the  SOC  buys  contracts  for  each  month in  equal
amounts,  starting  from  September  and  up to February  (of  the  next  year).  As the
contracts  approach  their  maturity  month,  the  SOC  reverses  the  contract  by  selling
in the  month  3efore  expiration  an identical  contract,  e.g., in August  of each
year the  SOC  sells  the  September  contract  of that  year.  We assume  also that  the
SOC  buys and  sells  all  contracts  gradually  throughout  the  month so that  it  pays
or obtains the average price for the contracts in eacth  month.  Th-is  is to assure
comparability  to the  SOC's  cash transactions  which,  since  we use average  cash
price  data,  are  also  assumed  to take  place  gradually  throughout  the  month.
We have  4 1/2  years  of observations  on futures  prices  (starting  July 1986
through  December  1990)  and  can  therefore  simulate  only  eight  six-monthly  hedges,
starting  the  first  in  July 1986  and  going  through  January  1990. We use a  hedge
ratio  of one  which was shown above  to be a conservative,  yet efficient  hedge
ratio  for  short-term  hedging.  Table  3  reports  the  important  results  from  the  six-
month  hedging  strategy  applied  to  each  of  the  crude  oils. The  last  row  (Futures)
reports  some  statistics  on the  N.Y. futures  contract.
' 3 e choose a six-month hedging strategy since trading in longer term
contacts  is  usually  not  nearly  so  liquid  and  a  six-month  horizon  should  allow  the
SOC  and the  country  sufficient  lead  time in adjusting  domestic  prices.-19-
Table 3:  LONG-TERM HEDGING STRATEGIES
($/bbl)
PRICES  CASH  STD  NET  STD NET  X REDUCT
CASH ..  .__  ___  _  CAS  _  _  __  _  __  __  __  __  _
AVERAGE  -0.357  1.92  0.743  0.60  68.75
DUBAI  -0.361  1.91  0.792  0.46  75.92
UK BRENT  -0.372  1.83  0.708  0.60  67.21
ALASKA NS  -0.365  2.04  0.698  0.83  59.31
TIA JUANA  -0.858  2.62  0.022  0.95  63.74
SAHARAN  -0.149  1.71  0.914  0.35  79.53
KHAFJI  -0.255  2.06  0.769  0.57  72.33
BONNY  -0.238  1.79  0.853  0.33  81.56
ATTAKA  -0.304  2.04  0.749  0.70  65.69
ARAB  -0.246  2.15  0.674  0.71  66.98
ES SIDER  -0.256  1.80  0.825  0.35  80.56
ISTNO  -0.032  2.34  0.717  0.72  69.23
LAGOTREC  0.167  2.32  0.916  1.50  35.34
_  _  -0.034  2.39  0.714  1.09  54.39
ORIENTE  0.074  2.58  _  _0.822  0.89  65.50
CANO LINi  0.043  2.53  O0.792  0 .74  70.75
WTI  I  -0.050  2.31  O0.699  O0.71  69.26
UTURES  _________  0.884  _1.99
In  Table  3,  the  column  "Cash"  reports  the  average  loss  or  gain  (all  figures
in dollar  per barrel) the SOC incurred  over the eight planning  periods as a
result  of spot oil  price  movements  during  the  six-monthly  period.  For  example,
the  entry -0.032  for the  Istmo  strategy  reflects  an average  loss  per barrel  of
3.2 cents from buying Istmo at higher prices during the eight six-monthly
periods.  It  shows  that  on  average  the  SOC  did  not  pay  much  higher  prices  over  the
planning  period when compared to the price in the raonth  when the plan was
started. The column "STD CASH" reports the standard deviation of the unexpected
higher or lower cash payments and is thus a reflection of the uncertainty in the
spot market. For Istmo, for example, the standard deviation of spot prices was-20-
$2.33/barrel.  This indicates  that the SOC experienced  substantial  uncertainty
over  the  planning  periods.  The  column  "NET"  represent  the  net  results  of  hedging;
it is  thus  equal  to the  gain  or  loss  on the  cash  position  minus  the  gain  or loss
on the futures  positions.  In the  cane of Istmo,  the  hedging  strategy  led  to an
effective  price  paid for  oil  which  was 71.7  cents  per  barrel  lower  than  average
spot prices for the planning  periods.  The column "STD NET" indicates  the
riskiness  of the  net  result:  the  standard  deviation  of the  net  gain  or loss.  The
column  "%  REDUCT"  indicates  the  percentage  risk  reduction  achieved  through  using
the futures.  In the case of Istmo  again, the risk reduction  as a result  of
hedging  is 69%; in other  words,  the SOC is able to lay  off 69% of the  risk of
unexpected  price  movements  during  the  six-month  planning  horizons  using  the  long-
term  futures  hedges.  Finally,  the  column  "MONTH"  indicates  the  standard  deviation
of the monthly  net gains and losses  from unwinding  the futures  contracts  and
buying  the  crudes  imports.  This  standard  deviation  is  different  from  the  standard
deviation  "STD NET" since  this is  a standard  deviation  of (48)  monthly  figures
and the  "STD  NET" is  a standard  deviation  of only  eight  averages.
Table  3  indicates  that,  on  average,  the  six-month  hedging  strategy  achieved
a risk  reduction  of  about  69%  in  the  case  of Istmo,  while  also  leading  to  a lower
purchase  price  for  oil  by about  US$0.72  per  barrel. The  gains  in terms  of lower
import  prices could,  of course,  have been losses if a different period  was
chosen,  but for any period  the  six-month  hedging  strategy  would have led to a
substantial  decline in oil price volatility.  For most crude oils, the risk
reduction  was  between  65%  and  80%. The  best  performers  were  the  same  as  in the
short-term  (transactions)  hedge,  which is to be expected  given the fact that
these  crudes  follow  the  WTI contract  more closeby  than  the  others. The results
indicate  that  long-term  hedging  of Lagotreco  and Bachaquero  (based  on the  N.Y.
futures  contract)  could  be problematical.  However,  as reported  above,  Lagotreco
has  followed  the  N.Y.  futures  contract  more  closely  since  August  1988,  and thus
hedging  Lagotreco  in this  way  may be possible  now.-21-
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The  row  "FUTURES"  in  Table  3 indicates  the  average  gain  on the  position  of
the  futures,  $0.884  per  barrel,  and its  standard  deviation,  1.99.  In this case
the  six-month  futures  led  to an average  gain  over the  period.  In general,  this
is  not  to  be  expected  and  using  futures  will  not  necessarily  lead  to  lower  prices
paid for  imports  but to more stable  prices  and  thus less  risk.
Figure  2  shows  the  gains  and  losses  for  the  Istmo  hedges  over  the  July 1986
to January  1990 period. It shows,  on a six-month  cycle,  the gain/loss  on the
futures,  the cash, and the  net gain/loss.  It also shows the gain and loss of
unwinding  the futures  on a monthly  basis.  As can  be seen,  the  net is much less
volatile than  the cash figure since every  time  the  futures  offsets  the  cash.-22-
Also,  month  by  month  the  gains  are  very  stable.  In 1990  the  gains  of  hedging  are
quite  large  as prices  increased  later  in the  year.
Figure  3  plots  the  same  futures,  cash,  net  and  monthly  gains  and  losses  for
hedging Lagotreco.  As can be observed,  there is much more volatility in the
monthly  net gain/loss than in Figure  2, a reflection  of the fact that this
strategy  achieves  only a 35X  risk reduction.
Other risk  management  techniques  exist  to hedge long-term  risk.  The  most
applicable  to  a  SOC is  a commodity  swap  which  allows  effective  long-term  price
insurance.'  A  commodity  swap is a  series of commodity forward contracts;
however, it  does  not  involve deliveries of  physical commodities since
transactions  are  made as pure financial  transactions.  Assume  that  a SOC  wants
to  'lock-in"  the price of oil imports  for the next five years, and that it
expects  to import  2.5  million  barrels a year.  The SOC could arrange  with a
commercial  bank the following  commodity  swap  agreement.
Amount:  The  U.S.dollar  equivalent  of 2.5  million  barrels  of oil
a year.
Fixed  Price  Payor:  SOC.
Floating  Price  Payor:  Commercial  bank.
Maturity:  5 years,  with annual,  semi-annual  or monthly  payments.
Fixed  Price:  US$ 20.00  per barrel  (indicative).
Floating  Price:  The  average  daily  closing  spot  price  of  WTI  oil  over  the
year,  semester,  or month  preceding  each  payment  date.
Settlement:  Netting-out.'5
14For  details  see  Masuoka (1990).
15 "Netting-out"  means  that  a  settlement  amount  is  calculated  by  multiplying
the  contracted  amount  by the  difference  between  the  fixed  and floating  prices.
The floating  price payor pays the calculated  amount  if the floating  price is
higher  than the fixed  price,  and vice versa.  The bank would lay off the oil
price risk it takes on in this swap by undertaking  an offsetting  swap or by
engaging  in futures  transactions  to roll over risks.  The cash flows passing
through  the  intermediating  bank  would  not  quite  offset  each  other  thus  allowing
the  bank to make a return  for  bearing  the  credit  risk.-23-
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In  this  example,  the  SOC  would  buy  oil  from  any  th'Lrd  party  from  time  to  time  at
the spot  price.  However,  the  SOC's  expenses  for the next 5 years  would
effectively  be fixed  by means of the oil swap at a price of oil of US
$20.00/barrel  since  the  floating  rates  payments  from  the  commercial  bank  will
offset  the  variable  costs  of  import  payments.
For  creditworthiness  reasons,  the  SOC  may  have  to  put  up  some  "collateral"
to  assure  lenders  of  performance  under  the  terms  of  the  swap  agreement.  One  way
to do this  is by using  a "marked-to-market"  swap  which  would thus  operate
similarly  to a futures  contract.  Other  methods  are also possible  such as
escrowing  some  foreign  exchange  at  a foreign  bank. An  important  point  is  that
the  oil  swap  reduces  the  SOC's  probability  of  financial  distress.  Even  if  the-24-
price of oil increases to, say,  $40.00/barrel, expenses will stay the same.  This
improved credit risk  may lower the cost  of financing  SOC'  s  working capital or  may
give the SOC access to new lenders.
Finally, swaps do not necessarily refer to long-term coverage but can also
cover shoi.ter  periods such as three or six months.  A SOC may prefer swaps for
shorter term  hedging over futures/options if liquidity for  margin calls or option
premiums  becomes  a problem.  Also,  futures and  options  can be  very  labor-
intensive, requiring frequent monitoring of the market.  Swaps require little
monitoring once they are in place.  Swaps for shorter periods are now commonly
available in the over-the-counter market.-25-
5.  INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS BY A
STATE-OWNED OIL COMPANY
The following major constraints and concerns regarding  the use of risk
management techniques such  as futures and  options  by SOCs in  developing countries
are often raised:
(i)  Cash Flow
Using oil futures and options requires an  off-shore account to  buy futures
and options and, more  importantly, to cover margin  calls. The  initial dollar
amount needed to buy futures (initial margins) and options (premiums) is under
the control of the SOC and can thus be planned.  However, maintenance margin
calls can require daily injection of funds depending on the daily fluctuations
of the oil prices.  For example, say that the SOC buys one oil futures contract
and subsequently oil prices drop by 10%.  The SOC will need  to put  into the
margin account as much money  as whpn it-  hoa.lht-  the contract. When prices rise,
money will be deposited into the SOC's  margin account if the  price movements are
in the same direction as the SOC's position, i.e., if the SOC is long and prices
increase, the SOC will be able to withdraw from its account.  However, the SOC's
margin calls and funds  available for  withdrawal during the life of the hedge will
be unknown, as this depends on the overall exposure of the SOC and the daily
price movements.
To manage the cash-flow problem, a stop-loss position can be taken. That
is, if prices fall below a certain level and the SOC is long,  it orders the
liquidation of its position.  This, however, reduces the effectiveness  of the
hedge."
6 The use of  options is another way to by-pass  the problem  of margin
calls.  When buying calls and puts there are no margin calls. Buying a call or
put does not involve risks associated with the buyer of the call or put since
they are guaranteed through the exchange.  Selling calls and puts does involve
'6Further  note that margins can be put up by posting a US Treasury bill or
equivalent instrument and therefore no interest is lost on margins.-26-
credit  risk (i.e.,  the  seller  may  not  deliver)  and  requires  margin  calls.  Since
the SOC is an oil  buyer,  it  will be buying  call  options  and  no margin  will  be
necessary.  Of course,  the  use  of  options  involves  a  cost  in  terms  of  the  premium
paid.
To assess  the  cash flow implications  of a SOC  executing  the  transactions
involved  in  a  hedging  strategy,  we simulated  the  following  futures  position.  In
each  month  of the  year the  SOC  buys 100  contracts  of the second  nearby  futures
contract  at the  beginning  of the  month,  e.g.,  in  January  1991,  SOC  buys  the  March
1991  contract.  100 contracts  correspond  to 100,000  barrels  of oil per month,
which  amounts  on a yearly  basis  to 1.2  million  barrels. The SOC is  assumed  to
hold  these  100  futures  contract  throughout  e  tch  month  and  to  sell  them  at the  end
of the  month.  The SOC is now faced  with the  possibility  of morgin  calls  and
margin  withdrawals.  It  is further  assumed  that  the  initial  margin  is  $2,000  per
contract  (the  minimum  dictated  by the  NYMEX,  see  contract  terms  in  Annex 1)  and
that  the  maintenance  margin  is  75%  of  the  initial  margin,  or $1,500.  This  implies
that the  SOC  will need to maintain  at least  $1,500  per contract  in its  margin
account.  If, due to a drop in  prices,  futures  prices are resettled  and the
account  falls  below  $1,500  per  contract,  the  SOC  will face a  margin  call  of an
amount  equal  to  that  required  to  bring its  account  per contract  back up to  the
initial  margin  of $2,000  per  contract.  If,  due  to  a  price  increase,  resettlement
leads to  the margin account rising above $2,000  per contract, the SOC can
withdraw  the  surplus  in  excess  of $2,000  per contract.
If the  SOC  would  have followed  this  strategy  over  the  period  July  1986 to
December  1990,  the  maximum  possible  margin  call  the  SOC  would  have faced  on any
single  day for a total  of 100  nearby  futures  contracts  bought  would have been
$400,000.  This extremely  large  margin  call  would  have occurred  in the  month  of
August  1990  when  the  futures  price  fell  by $4  per  barrel  on the  18th  trading  day
of that  month  (from  $30.91  to  $26.91).  The  maximum  withdrawal  the  SOC  would  have
been  able to  make  over this  period  would  have  been $317,000  on the  18th  trading-27-
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day of the month of October  1990  when the futures  price increased  by $3.17  a
barrel  (from  $31.08  to $34.25).  It is  not  surprising  that  the  SOC  would  have  had
the largest margins calls and withdrawals  in the fall of 1990, given the
extremely  large  price  volatility  in  the  oil  market  during  that  period  as  a  result
of the  Gulf  war.
For all other months  considered  the maximum  calls and withdrawals  were
considerably  less.  Figure  4  plots  the  maximum  calls  and  withdrawals  per  contract
for  each  month  between  July  1986  and  December  1990  (for  100  contracts  the  amounts
need to be multiplied  by 100).  The lower  half of  the figure  shows  the  maximum
calls in each month and in  the upper  half the maximi.n  withdrawals  in each month
are  shown.  The figure  also  shows  the  average  daily  withdrawal  or  margin  call  in
each  month.  As can  been seen,  the  Fall  1990  period  was  exceptional.  On average,-28-
the  SOC  would  have  been  able  to  withdraw  money  from  its  account  over this  period
as  futures  prices  increased.  The  average  withdrawal  per  day  per  contract  over  the
whole period  July 1986 through  December  1990  was $28.44  (or  2.U8 per barrel).
The largest  average  withdrawal  over  any  month  would  have  been in  September  1990,
$610  per  day  per contract,  as the  futures  price  rose from  $28.56  per  barrel  on
the  first  of the  month  to $39.51  per  barrel  at the  end  of the  month--a  gain of
about  $11  per  barrel  or $11,000  per  contract.  The largest  margin  call  would  have
been in  the  month  of  June  of 1988,  $122  per  day  per  contract,  as  prices  fell  over
that  month  from  $17.72  to $15.16.
It can  be seen  that  margin  calls  can  be substantial  and the  SOC  therefore
needs to have access  to funds  on very short  notice.  We estimate  that for 100
contracts,  the SOC should  have access  on an almost  daily basis to at least
$100,000.  Of course,  th_  need for funds  for  margin  calls does  not represent  a
cost to the  SOC  since  the  negative  cash  flow impacts  on  margin  calls  are  offset
by lower  future  oil import  bills.  It  only implies  that  the  SOC's  cash  needs  will
change  over time.
(ii) Negative  Publicity
Within  governments  in developing  countries  there  is concern  that the  use
of  options  and  futures  will  lead  to  criticism  and  negative  publicity. If  the  SOC
"locks  in" a price  of US$30  per barrel  by using futures,  yet later the price
falls  to  US$20  per  barrel,  there  may  be public  criticism. However,  the  use of
call options would allow the SOC to protect itself from price rises while
allowing  it to  participate  in the  benefits  of lower  prices,  i.e.,  they  can set
a maximum  price.  There is, of course,  a cost to that insurance  in terms of
premiums  paid.  Premiums  become  more expensive  the more insurance  (i.e.,  the
lower  the  exercise  price)  the  SOC  buys (see  Figure  1).  But the  use of options
is something  to  consider  if the  possibility  of negative  publicity  is  a concern.-29-
The general  issue  here is that  the  objective  of using  futures  and  options
should not be to make money but to guarantee  a  'reasonable'  price for oil
purchases and reduce the exposure (risk) from oil price movements.  This
reasonable  price  should  allow  the  SOC to  avoid  losses  on its  operations,  reduce
cashflow  problems,  and guarantee  a relatively  stable  price for the consumer.
What is this "reasonable"  price?  The SOC  will need to determine  that,  on the
basis  of  sensitivity  analyses  of  its  cash  flow  and  profitability.  Of  course,  the
price  should  be attainable  in the  light  of prevailing  oil  market  conditions.
On this  point,  it  is  interesting  to  note  what  a  senior  Mexican  official  had
to say  about  Mexico's  recent  hedging  activities  which  resulted  in locking-in  a
price  of  US$17  per  barrel  for  its  exports  over  a  six  month  period. He  was  quoted
by the  Washington  Post (March  27,  1991)  as saying:  "We said,  listen,  given  the
uncertainty  and given  the  volatility--it  can go to  US$40  (a  barrel)  and it can
drop  to  US$10-  -we  have  a  budget  here,  a  budget  that  we  have to  cover. We did  not
do it to be ahead.  The government  does not speculate  in that sense.  Doing
nothing  is  speculative",  he said. "It  does  look  now  that  we are  ahead  compared
to doing nothing.  Some days we do not do as well.  But we sleep well".' 7
Regarding  Mexico's  decision,  the  Wall Street  Journal  (March  11, 1991)  quoted  a
Finance  Ministry  official  as follows:  "It is extremely  important  for us that
investors  know that,  no matter  what happens  to the  price of oil, the economic
program is on for 1991.  Regardless  of what happens, we have got US$17 a
barrel..  .and there's  enough  in the  kitty".  On the importing  side, Brazil  and
Chile  have  recently  used futures  and  options  to  hedge  part  of their  oil  imports.
The idea of fixing  a price  over a relatively  long  period  of time is not
novel  in  developing  countries.  Ghana,  C8te  d'Ivoire  and  Cameroon  sell  forward  a
large  part  of their  cocoa  crop  for  at least  a  year  or more.  In most  years they
"7At  the  time  of the  Washington  Post article  the  price  of  Mexican  crude  was
US$15.76.-30-
sell  some  or  all  of the  crop  before  they  harvest  it.18  Furthermore,  price  fixing
is  cften  done  by state  marketing  boards  (SMB)  and  negative  publicity  attached  to
prices  received  is  seldom  a  concern  or  a  problem. By  fixing  a  price  the  SMBs  are
able to guarantee  a price  to the  farmer  without  incurring  a risk.' 9
A final  note on the issue  of negative  publicity.  To avoid or overcome
negative publicity, the  hedging strategies adopted should have  a  broad
governmental  mandate. One  way  to  do this  would  be through  the  establishment  of
a High Level Committee (HLC),  consisting  of representatives  of the SOC, the
Central  Bank, the  Ministry  of Energy,  and the  Ministry of Finance.  The HLC
would, for example, discuss and outline the hedging strategy of  the SOC,
determine  the  financial  needs  of  carrying  out  such  operations,  as  well  as  oversee
and control the hedging activities  of the SOC.3  The advantages  of the HLC
structure  would  be to  spread  the  responsibility  for  the  hedging  activities  at the
highest levels.  In addition  to spreading  responsibility  (through  appropriate
institutional  arrangements,  such  as  a  HLC)  there  should  be  provisions  that  would
foster  dissemination  of knowledge  about risk management  techniques (through
educational  seminars)  within  the  government  and  to the  general  public.
(iii)  Flexibility  of  Action
One  of the  major  problems  that  a typical  SOC faces  is  an inability  to act
fast  when  the  situation  demands. In  many  cases  a  SOC  does  not  handle  the  foreign
1'This  is done, however,  through  bilateral  forward  contracts rather  than
futures  or options. The  benefits  of forward  contracts  are that  both buyer  and
seller avoid commissions,  premiums,  margin calls, and extend coverage into
maturities  where  futures  markets  become  illiquid. The  big  drawback  is  that  both
buyer and  seller  are  exposed  to performance  risks  which  can  be significant.
'9SMBs  in Ghana,  C8te d'Ivoire  and Cameroon  are able to contract  forward
because  they  have established  excellent  reputations.  However,  this is a rather
special  case,  with the  rule  being  that  performance  risk is  considerable  in  most
other  cases.
2The  actual  implementation  of the  general  hedging  strategy  will have to  be
with the  SOC  which  will  need to  establish  a  risk  management  unit (RKU)  to do so.
The RMU would consist  of a  group  of staff  highly skilled  in the use of risk
management  techniques.-31-
exchange  involved. This is  normally  done  by the  Central  Bank (see  the  case  of
Costa  Rica in Section  3).  This can lead  to two  difficulties:  (i)  in obtaining
foreign  exchange  to  purchase  futures  or options,  and (il)  in the  maintenance  of
a  margin  account.  The  problems  could  be  solved  by  establishing  a  continuous,  open
line  of  communication  between  the  SOC  and  the  Central  Bank. Staff  in  the  Central
Bank  would  need to be assigned  as points  of contact  with the  SOC.  They should
be able to qvickly  authorize  funds  needed for the SOC's hedging activities,
particularly  for  margin  calls. The  limits  within  Central  Bank  staff  can  act  will
need to be determined  by the Central Bank in coordination  with the SOC and
possibly  the  Ministry  of Finance.
(iv)  Legal  Svstem
In  many developing  countries  state  owned  companies  are  not  allowed  to  use
futures  or options. This would  need to be changed  so that the  SOCs could  use
risk  management  techniques;  a  new  legal  framework  would  have  to  be  drawn  up  where
the  use of futures  and options  (and,  in general,  the  use of foreign  financial
markets)  is allowed.  Some developing  countries  have such legislation  (e.g.,
Brazil),  and  recently  Colombia  has  embarked  on  establishing  legislation  to  allow
the  use of futures  and  options  markets.
(v)  Accountabl  ity
For  any  risk  management  system  to  perform  effectively,  a  system  of checks
and  balances should be  built-in.  A  system to record trades, financial
transactions,  and all other activities  related to risk management  should  be
established  in  order  to  allow  full  and  proper  evaluation  of trading  performance
and to ensure  the  accountability  of the system. As an example,  an experienced
New  York  brokerage  house  outlined  for  us  a system  for  monitoring  and  evaluating
hedging  activities  (see  Annex  3).-32-
6.  CONCLUDING  REMARS AND QOUTLINE  O  POQSSBLELINES OF ACTION
The aim  of this  paper  was to  examine  the  applicability  of  risk  management
techniques  to  a typical  SOC  importing  crude  oil  and to  provide  estimates  of the
gains  if  such  techniques  were  implemented.  We examined  the  relationship  between
the  different  crude  oils  which  are  imported  by  developing  countries  and  the  N.Y.
futures  contract. We found  a significant  relationship  between all the  crudes
studied  and the  N.Y. futures  contract,  with the  exception  of Bachaquero  crude.
The  basis  risk  in  using  the  N.Y.  futures  contract  to  hedge  these  crudes  was  found
to be  in the  range of  3-26%, and  the hedge  ratio was  found to be not
significantly  different from one.  The  results from hedging dollar oil
expenditures  instead  of  barrels  (physical  hedge)  are  quite  similar. In  summary,
we recommend  the  use  of  N.Y. futures  contracts  to  hedge  crude  oil  imports  (with
the  exception  of  Bachaquero  crude),  particularly  th-  lighter  crudes,  with  a  hedge
ratio  of one for all crudes. This recommendation  holds for either  futures  or
options  based  on the  N.Y. futures  contract.
We also  identified  the  risk  exposures  that  a typical  SOC  faces. These  are
transactions  risk,  and  long-term  risk. Transactions  risk  refers  to  the  risk  from
price  fluctuations  between  ordering  and  shipping. Long-term  risk refers  to  the
exposure  of  the  SOC  and  the  national  economy  to  longer-term  trends  in  oil  prices.
Here longer  term  was taken  to be a six-month  planning  horizon.  Within such a
period  the  SOC  and  the  economy  should  be able  to  adjust  smoothly  to any  shift  in
international  oil  prices. We recommend  the  use  of futures  and  options  to  hedge
both transactions  and long-term  risks. Table  4 summarizes  our  recommendations
and  major  findings. If a six-month  (approximate)  hedge is  undertaken,  there  is
no need for  additional  hedging  activity  to cover  the  transactions  risk.-33-
Table  4:  Summary  of Recommendations
Length  of  Potential
Required  Coverage  Instruments  Risk  Reduction
Transaction  risks  approx.  one  month  futures  72X - 85%
Long-term  risk  six  months  futures/options  64% - 81%
Long-term  risk  more than  one  commodity  swaps  n.a.
_  _  _  ___  year.__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
In  studying  hedging  of  transactions  risk  we simulated  a  scenario  where  one-
month  exposures  were  hedged  using  the  second  nearby  N.Y. futures  contract. The
potential gains from pursuing such a strategy  are between 73% and 86% risk
reduction  for  all  crudes  except  Bachaquero.  The  hedging  potential  for  Bachaquero
is more limited;  only  about  60% risk  reduction  can  be achieved.
For long-term  risk  we simulated  a scenario  in  which the  SOC  buys at six-
monthly intervals  the six  nearby futures  corttracts,  which it sells  gradually
throughout  the  following  six-month  period. We choose  a six-month  horizon  since
these futures are actively traded.  The potential risk reduction gains from
pursuing  such  a strategy  are  on the  average  about  70%. However,  much less  risk
reduction  can  be  achieved  hedging  Lagotreco  and  Bachaquero  crude  imports  in  this
way (only  about  35% to 54%).  For  hedging  over longer  periods  we recommend  oil
swaps  as the  best risk management  tool.
Finally,  we identified  four constraints  to the use of risk management
techniques  by SOCs.  These  are: (i)  Cash Flow: the need for foreign  funds to
purchase  futures,  margin  calls  and  option  premiums;  (ii)  Negative  Publicity:  the
possibility  of criticism  which could  arise from the use futures.  To counter
this,  options can be used,  but at a price.  Furthermore,  it is advisable  to
distribute the responsibility  for hedging across the government  and spread
knowledge about hedging and  hedging instruments through education; (iii)
Elexibility_of  Action:  where  applicable,  there  is  need  for  a  close  relationship
between  the  SOC  and the  Central  Bank  to assure  foreign  exchange  availability  to-34-
carry-out  the  risk  management  program;  and (iv)  Legal,  Systm: where  applicable,
the  legal  restrictions  that  prevent  SOCs  from  using  futures  and  options  and  other
financial  instruments  should  be removed.*35-
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ANNEX 1L CONTBACI  SPECIFICATIONS
Table,  1:  CRUDRE  OIL:  OPTIONS  CONTRAQ:  SPECIFICATIONS
TP,ADITIUNI
One  NYMEX  crude  oil futures  contract.
TRADNG HOU  RS
9:45  a.m. - 3:10  p.m. (New  York Time)
ITRDING  MONTS
Fifteen  consecutive  months.
MINIMM  PRICE;  FLUCTUATION
$.01 (1  cent)  per  barrel  ($10  per option  contract).
MAXIMUM  DAILY  LIMIT
None
LAST  TRADING  DbY_  (EXPIRATION  DAY)
Second  Friday  of the  month  prior to the  delivery  month  of the  underlying  crude
oil futures  contract,  provided  there  are at least  five  days  remaining  to trade
in the  underlying  futures  contract.
SERCISE
By  a Clearing  Member  to the  NYMEX  Clearing  House  not  later  than  6:00  p.m.,  or 45
minutes  after  the  price  of the  option  being  exercised  or the  underlying  futures
settlement  price  is  posted. Whichever  is  later,  on any  day  up to and  including
the  option's  expiration.
2IKE PRICES
Strike  prices  are in increments  of $1.00 per barrel.  At all times at least
eleven  strike  prices  are  available  for  puts  and  calls  on the  underlying  futures
contracts.  The  middle  strike  price  is  closest  to  the  previous  day's  close  of  the
underlying  futures  contract. Strike  price  boundaries  are  adjusted  according  to
the  futures  price  movements.-37-
hfbl_2:  CONTRACT  SPECIFI  CATIONS  CLRU-DE  OIL)
CONTRACT  UNIT
1,000  U.S.  barrels  (42,000  gallons).
TRADING  HOURS
9:45  a.m. - 3:10  p.m. (New  York Time).
TRADO
Trading  presently  is  conducted  in  eighteen  consecutive  months  commencing  with  the
current  calendar  month (e.g.,  on October  6, 1989,  trading  occurs  in all  months
from  November  1989  through  April 1991)  and some longer-dated  contracts.
PRICE  OOTATiITON
In dollars  and  cents  per barrel  (e.g.,  $17.25  per  barrel).
MINIUM  PRIC-E  LUC-TUATIO
$.Ol (.01  cent)  per  barrel  ($10  per contract).
MAXII~lM ILY  IMtIT£
$1.00 (1  dollar)  per  barrel ($1,000  per contract). There is no maximum  daily
limit  on price  fluctuations  during  the  month  preceding  the  delivery  month.
EXPAELMI
In  the  event  that a settlement  price  is  established  at the  maximum  daily limit
on  price  fluctuations,  this  limit  will  be increased  subject  to  a  variable  limits
formula. The maxiw.m  expanded  limit  is  $2.00  per  barrel.
DELIVERYAND GADES
F.O.B.  seller's  facility,  Cushing,  Oklahoma,  at  any  pipeline  or  storage  facility
with pipeline  access  to Arco or Texaco.  Par crude:  West Texas Intermediate,
0.4% sulfur,  40%  API gravity.
DELIVERY  PERIOD
All deliveries  must be initiated  after the first calendar  day and completed
before  the  last calendar  day of the  delivery  month.
EXCHAGEL  OFURES  FOR.-OR  IN CONNECTINWIH.  PHYSICALL(KEFP)
The  buyer  or seller  may exchange  a futures  position  for  a physical  position  of
equal quantity  by submitting  a notice to the Exchange.  EFPs may be used to
either  initiate  or liquidate  a futures  position.
IAST  TRAINg  DAY
Trading  terminates  at the close  of business  on the  third  business  day  prior  to
the twenty-fifth  calendar  day of the  month  preceding  the  delivery  month.-38-
Original  margin  for  an outright  position:  $2,000.
Original  margin  for  an intermarket  spread  position:  $1,000.
Original  margin  for  an intramarket  spread  position:  $300.-39-
AMNEX  2:  E-STIMATION  QO HEEDGE  RATIOS  21
Assume  that  futures  contracts  exist  for  delivery  at each  month  over the
planning  horizon. Currently,  the  New  York  Mercantile  Exchange  trades  crude  oil
futures  contracts  maturing  each  month  over  an  approximately  18-month  horizon  and
some  longer-dated  contracts.  Assume  the  SOC  purchases  futures  for  each  maturity
at the  beginning  of the planning  horizon and holds them (without  adjustment)
until  they  are liquidated  at the  relevant  maturity  date.  Further,  assume  that
the futures  markets  are  efficient,  in the sense  that the expected  return  from
holding  futures  is zero.2  Under these  assumptions,  the SOC's  cash surplus  in
period  i  can  be written
Y,  - fXA  - PAQi  (2.1)
where:
f-  F 1(i) - F 0(i) is the difference  between the futures price for
delivery  in  period  i,  F,(i),  and  the  same  futures  contract  quoted  at
the  beginning  of the  planning  horizon,  F0(i);
- quantity  of futures  purchased  (sold,  if  negative)  at the  beginning
of the  planning  horizon  for  delivery  at i;  and
Pi  - P0(i) - P*i  is the  difference  between  the  actual  oil  price at i  and
that  expected  at the  beginning  of the  planning  horizon.
0  - Amount  of oil imported  (barrels).
The futures  prices,  quoted  in  US dollars,  are  converted  to local  currency  using
the  exchange  rate  applicable  when  the  transaction  takes  place. Notice  that  P*(i)
>  P*.  leads to a  decline in the cash surplus  but Fi(i)  >  FO(i)  leads to an
increase.
With futures,  the net cash surplus  at the end of the planning  horizon
becomes:  2
Y  - SUM  (f 1 X 1 - PAQ)-  (2.2)
This cash  surplus  now  has two  random  components,  spot  prices  and future  prices.
The aim is to choose  futures  positions  X;  for  every  period  to  minimize  the  risk
surrounding  the  net cash  surplus.
The  appropriate  hedging  ratio  will  depend  on  the  relationship  between  spot
and  futures  price  movements. Suppose  that  there  is  a simple  linear  relationship
between  unexpected  oil  price  shocks  in the  spot  and futures  markets:
pi  - b,f 1 (2.3)
where  b;  is a parameter  that  may change  for  different  periods  over the  planning
horizon  and is therefore  indexed  with an i.  Equation  (2.3)  shows that some
proportion,  b,,  of any price sb  kck  in the futures  market transfers into an
unexpected  change  in the  spot  prLce.
'See  Labuszewski  and  Myhoff  (1988a  and 1988b)  for  more details.
fThis  assumption  is  for  convenience and  allows  attention to  focus
exclusively  on  the  hedging  characteristics  of  futures  trading.
2 t.djustments  can  be  made  for  changes  in  interest  rates.-40-
Substituting  (2.3)  into  (2.2)  allows  the  net  spot  surplus  to  be  expressed
Y  SUM fi  (XY  - biQ 1).  (2.4)
If  X;  b1Qi for  all  i,  then  Y  - 0.  The  appropriate  hedge  ratio  is  equal  to  b.
Thus  we  have  the  following  result.
Result  I  With  no  quantity  uncertainty  and  in  the  absence  of  basis  risk,
pi  - bifi  and  a  futures  hedging  rule,  X;  - b 1Qi,  ensures  that  the  net
cash  surplus  is  always  zero.  All  risks  surrounding  the SOC's  net
cash  surplus  have  been  eliminated  via  hedging  with  futures.
The  problem  with  Result  1  is  that  it relies  on  a  simple,  deterministic
linear  relationship  between  spot  and  futures  price  shocks.  Although  spot  and
futures  prices  for  oil  obviously  are  closely  related,  we  would  not  expect  (2.3)
to  hold  exactly  at  all  times.  Spot  and  futures  prices  may  respond  differently
to  the  same  piece  of  new  information  if  it  has  different  implications  for  current
supply  and/or  demand  versus  future  supply  and/or  demand.  This  uncertainty
regarding  the  relationship  between  spot  and  futures  prices  leads  to  an
examination  of  basis  risk.
Assume  that  the  relationship  between  spot  and  futures  price  shocks  is
subject  to  a  random  disturbance:
pi  - b1fi  +  ui  (2.5)
where  u;  is  a  zero  mean  serially  uncorrelated  disturbance  term.  The  random
vrariable  u;  represents  that  part  of  spot  price  shocks  which  cannot  be  predicted
fully  from  observing  movements  in  futures  prices.  It  may  occur  as  a  result  of
exchange  rate  fluctuations  or  basis  fluctuations  (changing  relationships  between
spot  and  futures  prices).
Substituting  (2.5)  into  (2.2)  the  net  cash  surplus  becomes
Y  SUM [  f(XY  - b 1Q 1) - u1Qi]  . (2.6)
Thus,  the  hedging  rule  X;  b1Qi now  results  in  a  net  cash  surplus  of:
Y  - -SUM  u 1Q 3. (2.7)
The  only  remaining  source  of  risk  with  this  hedging  rule  is  fluctuations  in  u;.
It  can  be  shown  that  shocks  to  u,  represent  uninsurable  residual  risk  (the  basis
risk'  which  cannot  be  hedged  using  oil  futures  only.  Thus  we have  the  following
result.  Like  the  case  before,  the  appropriate  hedge  ratio  is  b.
Result  2  With  no  quantity  uncertainty  and  in  the  presence  of  basis  risk,  pi
- bif;  +  u;  and  the  futures  hedging  rule  X;  - bjQ, minimizes  the  risk
surrounding  the  SOC's  net  cash  surplus.  Residual  risk  is
uninsurable  and  cannot  be  reduced  further  using  only  the  oil  futures
market.
Because  part  of  the  fluctuations  in  ui  may  be  due  to  exchange  rate
movements,  it  is  possible  that  the  residual  risk  could  be  reduced  further  if  a
futures  or  forward  foreign  exchange  market  were  available  (Thompson  and  Bond,
1987).  However,  no  formal  futures  or  forward  markets  are  available  in  the
exchange  rates  for  many  developing  countries.
Similar  hedging  ratios  are  obtained  if,  instead  of  futures,  options  are
used.  Again,  with  or  without  basis  risk  the  SOC should  buy  an  amount  of  options
at  each  period  (Z,)  equal  to  the  relationship  Z;  b 1Qi.  In  the  case  of  options,
just  as  in the  case  of  futures,  the  b;  derived  from  the  relationship  between-41-
futures  and  spot  price  shocks--equations  (2.3)  or (2.5)--determines  the  optimal
hedge ratio.  In this case the strike  prices should  be chosen to equal the
current  futures  prices.-42-
ANNX  3  EXMPL  OFA  MNIORING  AND  EALUATION SYSTEM  FOR HEDGIN
1.  A resolution  by the  Board  of Directors  of the  SOC  recognizing  futures  and
options  as  legitimate  hedge  vehicles,  and  assigning  continuing
responsibility  to one or more Board members to oversee the hedging
operations  of the  organization  and  make  recommendations  to the  Board  for
needed changes. The  resolution should specify which departments  are
individually  authorized to  establish hedging operations and  assign
operating  responsibility  to the  department  head.
2.  For each department,  a hedge policy committee (Risk  Management  Unit)
should be  established to  g&'^her  all  relevant economic and  price
information  necessary  for  decision  making  and  establishing  hedging  policy
guidelines. The  committee  will  be responsible  for:
a.  Identifying  commitments  that establish a  physical or  financial
exposure, and as well, reviewing department  contracts for the
existence  of imbedded  options  and contingent  obligations.
b.  Establishing  the  level  of exposure  that is  acceptable  under  varied
economic  scenarios  and  price  circumstances.
c.  Authorizing specific hedging vehicles for use  in managing the
exposure  over the  designated  time  horizon.
d.  Appointing  an individual  hedge  manager  and assigning  authority  to
manage  the  hedge  program  under  the  policy  guidelines  established  by
the  hedge  committee.
3.  Appointment of  a  financial controls officer outside of  the policy
committee,  reporting  directly  to the  appropriate  members  of the  Board  of
Directors responsible  for hedging.  This individual  should have the
authority  to establish  financial  control  systems,  which include,  at the
minimum:
a.  The  design  of  a  system  that  reports  cash  and  futures  hedge  positions
simultaneously  by marking-to-the-market  cash positions  on a daily
basis.
b.  The  separation  of cash  transfers  from  the  planning  and  execution  of
hedge transactions.
c.  The verification  of price  changes  that result  in margin  variation
payments  with third  party  sources.
d.  Assurance  that  internal  trade  tickets  are  time-stamped  and  coded  to
a specific  hedge transaction.
e.  Establishment  of a  procedure  to spot  check  futures  orders  to insure
that all transactions  are executed in a timely manner and that
execution  prices  are consistent  with price limits  and within the
price ranges  that  occurred  within  the  relevant  period.
4.  Establish  a  monitoring  and  evaluation  system  that  reviews  the
effectiveness  of individual  hedge goals from the perspective  of both
policy  and  execution.4  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r1Figure  Al.  Istmo  and  WTI crude  oil  prices.
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